Kleene's well-known strong three-valued logic is shown to be one of a family of logics with similar mathematical properties. These logics are produced by an intuitively natural construction. The resulting logics have direct relationships with bilattices. In addition they possess mathematical features that lend themselves well to semantical constructions based on fixpoint procedures, as in logic programming.
Introduction
Kleene's strong three-valued logic is among the best-known and best-motivated of the multiplevalued logics, [14] . In this paper we show that it is one of a natural family of multiple-valued logics, all with similar motivations and properties. We begin with a brief look at the Kleene logic itself, and some previous generalizations of it.
One can think of Kleene's three values as false, true and ⊥ (unknown). This informal reading suggests two natural orderings, concerning 'amount of knowledge' and 'degree of truth.' If we do not know the (classical) truth value of some sentence, then it is possible that an increase in our knowledge could allow us to conclude the sentence is true, or equally well, that it is false. Thus we have a 'knowledge' ordering in which ⊥ is below both false and true. On the other hand, if degree of truth is the issue, not knowing a classical truth value to assign to a sentence is better than knowing the sentence is false, while knowing it is true is better yet. Then in the 'truth' ordering, false is less than ⊥ which is less than true. Both these orderings are displayed in the double Hasse diagram of Figure 1 .
The truth ordering of Figure 1 , ≤ t , provides us with a complete lattice, and the meet and join are exactly the ∧ and ∨ of Kleene's logic. The knowledge ordering, ≤ k , does not give us a complete lattice, but it does yield a complete semi-lattice: arbitrary meets exist, while joins exist for directed Belnap's four-valued logic is the simplest non-trivial example of a distributive bilattice. There are many others -indeed, there is an intuitively appealing way of constructing them, due to Ginsberg. A description can be found in [13] , and also in [9] . Also Kripke's approach to the theory of truth generalizes to allow distributive bilattices as the truth value space, see [6] . Logic programming admits of a similar generalization, see [10] and [8] .
The Kleene logic occurs as a natural sublogic of the Belnap one. Indeed, for many bilattices there is a natural way of separating out a sublogic with properties analogous to those of the Kleene logic -we choose those truth values that are, in a certain sense, consistent. Details can be found in [8] ; we do not go into it here. But this means we have a way of constructing a whole family of logics related to that of Kleene: use Ginsberg's method to construct distributive bilattices, and for those to which the technique applies, identify the sublogic of 'consistent' truth values. This, indeed, gives us an infinite family of examples (see [9] ). But, there is an unsatisfying feature to all this: we are producing Kleene-like logics by producing Belnap-like logics, then throwing part of them away. What we are after now is a more direct construction of Kleene-like logics. Indeed, we will see below that the direct construction even gives us a bigger family of logics to work witha pleasant side-effect.
Simple extensions
Before presenting the family of Kleene-like logics in full generality, we look at a natural subfamily that can serve both as motivation for what will come and as a family of interest in its own right. We begin with a special case of particular interest.
Suppose we are attempting to assign, not classical truth values, but probability estimates to formulas. That is, we want to map formulas to values in the unit interval, [0, 1]. We may be ignorant of some facts, so we may only be able to say the value of a formula lies in the sub-interval [a, b] , without being more specific. Indeed, one can make a case that in most circumstances this is the best we will be able to do. Suppose, then, that we take as our truth values such closed intervals:
Sandewall, in [17] , suggested that such truth values be ordered by set inclusion. [18] , that such generalized truth values should be partially ordered by 'degree of truth' so as to yield a lattice. In this case there is a natural way of doing so, set [ 
There is a least member, [0, 1], which we denote by ⊥, but no greatest one. Although this example was explicitly considered in Ginsberg, [13] , it does not yield a bilattice in his sense, and so served only as informal motivation. We want to consider it, and generalizations of it, for their own sakes.
As a first attempt at generalizing the construction above, we observe that sometimes we are not interested in the entire unit interval, but only discrete portions of it. For instance, we might want to restrict our attention to just the probabilities {0, In such a case we can still carry out the construction outlined above, and the conclusions still hold. The analog of closed subintervals always yields a truth value space on which two orderings, ≤ k and ≤ t can be defined as above, with ≤ t yielding a complete lattice, and ≤ k a complete semi-lattice. But now, specific restrictions on probabilities yield familiar results.
Suppose we make the most extreme restriction: we only consider the two probabilities 0 and 1. In this case there are three intervals: [0, 0] = {0}, [0, 1] = {0, 1}, and [1, 1] = {1}, which are identified with false, ⊥, and true respectively. In fact, it is easy to see that what we get is the structure of Kleene's three-valued logic, as in Figure 1 . Now consider the obvious next step: use the probabilities 0, which they thought of as combining both Kleene's and Lukasiewicz's three-valued logics. This work is continued in [11] . The motivation is essentially as follows. Suppose we have two notions of unknown. One, denoted u, represents permanently unknown; a conventional truth value will never be determined. The other, denoted k, represents a "temporary lack of knowledge which is expected to be resolved within the system's time-space bounds." Garcia and Moussavi suggest thinking of the Kleene three-valued logic as 'underneath', with its truth values being {false, u, true}. Then think of the truth values of the logic under construction as being certain sets of these. There are the singleton sets, {false}, {u} and {true}, of course. Further, it is suggested we think of k as corresponding to the entire set, {false, u, true}, so a value of k signifies that we do not know whether a formula is false, true, or permanently unknown, u. Given this motivation, it quickly becomes apparent that the four truth values thus far constructed are not enough. For instance, u ∧ k should correspond to the set resulting from conjuncting, in Kleene's logic, all members of {u} with all members of k = {false, u, true}, and this turns out to be {u, false}, which must be taken as a fifth truth value. Similarly u ∨ k yields a sixth, {u, true}. At this point, the system closes. Garcia and Moussavi go on to consider two orderings of their six truth values, following the motivation of [1] . An ordering by degree of truth is induced by the definitions of ∧ and ∨ sketched above; this is a complete lattice. Likewise, an ordering based on knowledge is considered, essentially amounting to reverse subset.
It is straightforward to check that the Garcia-Moussavi logic is exactly that of Figure 3 , except for designation of truth values. Their k corresponds to our [0, 1], representing complete lack of information. Likewise their u corresponds to our [ , 1} we get a ten-valued logic. In this way we can construct a whole family of generalizations of Kleene's three-valued logic, all with direct motivations. Further, these all share several useful mathematical features. But rather than going into this point here, we postpone it until we have presented a further generalization.
The general construction
We have been constructing multiple-valued logics from subsets of [0, 1], which is a linear ordering. Now we will extend things to allow more general orderings. This gives rise to two problems: what is the natural analog of the underlying linear ordering, and what is the analog of an interval. The answer to the first question is rather simple. The facts we used above about [0, 1], for instance, were things like closure under max and min. Likewise, if we had wanted to treat quantifiers we would have needed the infinitary analogs of these operations, sup and inf. This suggests that what we need of an ordering that is not linear is that it be a complete lattice, and this is the assumption we will make from now on. The second question, what is the analog of an interval, requires a little more consideration however.
Let L be a complete lattice, with ordering ≤ L . Once we have chosen a family of subsets called intervals, we will give it two orderings. One, ≤ k , is quite simple: reverse inclusion. The other, ≤ t , is more complex. If I 1 and I 2 are two intervals, whatever we may mean by that, it seems most natural to say I 2 represents greater truth, or less falsehood than I 1 if: for each x ∈ I 1 there is some y ∈ I 2 with x ≤ y, and for each y ∈ I 2 there is some x ∈ I 1 with x ≤ y; under these circumstances we set I 1 ≤ t I 2 . This coincides with the ≤ t ordering used in the previous section, and extends it plausibly to lattice orderings.
Once we have the ≤ t ordering, we have a corresponding equivalence relation: I 1 ≡ t I 2 if I 1 ≤ t I 2 and I 2 ≤ t I 1 . Whatever we take for our notion of interval in L, intervals that are equivalent in this sense should be identical, and this leads us to one part of the definition of interval. Suppose we call a subset S of L closed provided it contains, with any two comparable points, all points between them. That is, S is closed if, for each
And suppose we define the closure of a set S to be the smallest closed superset of S; denote it cl(S). Then it is straightforward to show that, for any subset S of L, S ≡ t cl(S). Consequently we require, of intervals, that they be closed subsets of L.
Being closed is not enough, however. We want the 'logical' operations on intervals to have simple characterizations. For instance, if I 1 and I 2 are intervals, we want to have a conjunction operation such that I 1 ∧ I 2 = {x ∧ y | x ∈ I 1 and y ∈ I 2 }, where x ∧ y is computed in the underlying lattice L. But we also want ≤ t to give to intervals the structure of a lattice, and we want this conjunction operation to be the meet of that lattice. We now proceed to check the conditions. First, I 1 ∧ I 2 ≤ t I 1 (and similarly for I 2 ). The argument is as follows. If 
Thus we are led to impose one more condition on intervals: they should be closed under the meet operation, ∧, of L.
Similar considerations lead us to impose closure under ∨ as well, and so intervals should, themselves, be sublattices of L. Further, when we come to take infinitary meets and joins into account we are led to requiring closure under them as well, and so the requirement becomes: intervals should be complete lattices themselves.
Summing things up so far, an interval in L is a closed, non-empty subset of L that is a complete lattice. But now that all the pieces are assembled, the definition can be considerably simplified. If I meets these conditions, since it is a complete lattice, it must contain its inf, say a, and its sup, say b. Since it is closed, it must contain all members of L between a and b as well. On the other hand,
b} is easily seen to meet all the conditions we have decided to require of an interval. Consequently, we are finally led to the following much simplified definition.
Certainly if one were naively to generalize the notion of interval from linear orderings to lattices, this is very likely the definition that would result. But then one might wonder whether it is sufficient -whether some more general notion might be better yet. The point of the work above is that the naive notion is also the natural one in this case.
Note From now on, we will only use the notation [a, b] for intervals, and so there is the tacit assumption that a ≤ L b.
Definition 3.2 Let L be a complete lattice. K(L) is the structure I(L), ≤ k , ≤ t where I(L) is the set of all intervals in L; and for
We will continue the notation used in the previous section: ∧ and ∨ are meet and join under ≤ t , and false and true are smallest and biggest members under this ordering; ⊗ and ⊕ are meet and join under ≤ k , and ⊥ is least member under it. In general we will use 0 and 1 for smallest and biggest members of L, so that false = 
Examples
We will see, later on, that a critical point concerning the underlying lattice is whether or not it has an order reversing involution. The linear examples above all do. In this section we present two examples involving lattices that are not linear, one with this property, one without. The first example is given in Figure 4 . The underlying lattice L has four points, while K(L) has nine. In this example, L does have an order reversing involution, interchange 0 and 1 while leaving a and b alone. We refer to this as 'vertical symmetry. ' For an intuitive motivation of the structures in Figure 4 , consider the following. Suppose we have two experts, A and B, and we ask each of them a yes/no question. Interpret the four points of L as follows. The point 0 represents a 'no' answer from both; a represents a 'yes' from A and a 'no' from B; b represents a 'yes' from B and a 'no' from A; and 1 represents a 'yes' from both. The next example, shown in Figure 5 , is more complicated, and does not involve vertical symmetry. We do not supply an informal application for this one.
Basic results
The definitions of ≤ k and particularly of ≤ t are more complicated than need be. The complexity came from our attempts to be as general as possible. Now that we have a simple definition of interval, it is easy to simplify the characterization of the orderings as well. The following Proposition has a straightforward proof, which we omit. 
Next, the four basic operations of K(L), meet and join under each of ≤ t and ≤ k , also have simple characterizations in terms of the meet and join of L.
Proposition 5.2 Again let [a, b] and [c, d] be intervals in K(L)
. Then:
Proof We check only item 3, the rest are similar.
The operations ⊗ and ⊕ are defined using the ≤ k ordering, but they behave well with respect to the ≤ t ordering, as well, and similarly for ∧ and ∨ and ≤ k .
if
Proof We only show item 2 as a representative.
The corresponding interlacing conditions for bilattices have played an important role in both their theory and their applications (see [6] , [10] , and [16] ). Stronger still are distributivity laws. Since there are four operations available, there are twelve distributive laws that are possible. The following proposition has a straightforward proof, which we omit. 
Relationships with bilattices
The Belnap logic, Figure 2 , contains the Kleene logic within it. In a similar way a large number of bilattices contain within them natural generalizations of Kleene's logic (see [9] ). In this section we compare these generalizations arising from bilattices with those constructed above, using intervals.
Suppose we have a pre-bilattice B, ≤ t , ≤ k . It has a negation if there is a mapping ¬ from B to itself that reverses ≤ t , leaves ≤ k alone, and is an involution. In the Belnap logic, for instance, negation is left-right symmetry. Likewise the pre-bilattice has a convolution if there is a mapping − from B to itself that reverses ≤ k , leaves ≤ t alone, and is an involution. In the Belnap logic convolution arises from the vertical symmetry. If both negation and convolution are present, we will generally require that they commute with each other. There are many such examples.
Suppose we call a member b of a pre-bilattice with a convolution consistent if b ≤ k −b. It can be shown that the consistent members always constitute a natural generalization of Kleene's logic, in the following sense. The collection of consistent members must contain false, ⊥ and true, and be closed under ∧ and ∨ and their infinitary analogs. In addition, they will be closed under ¬ if negation is present and commutes with conflation. Finally, they will be closed under ⊗ and its infinitary analog, but will only be closed under ⊕ for directed families. These are the conditions on Kleene's logic that made it appropriate for use in Kripke's theory of truth, for instance, and a similar theory can be developed based on any of these generalizations. So, the question that concerns us now is: under what circumstances can a Kleene-like logic, created using the interval construction presented earlier, be identified with the consistent members of a bilattice.
There is a simple way of constructing bilattices, due to Ginsberg. Suppose L 1 and
The intuition behind this construction is rather satisfying. Think of L 1 as the lattice of values used to measure the degree of belief we have in a sentence; probabilites, weighted opinions of experts, etc. Likewise think of L 2 as the lattice of values used to measure our degree of doubt. There is no requirement that we assess belief and doubt in the same way. Then a member of L 1 × L 2 embodies an assessment of both belief and doubt. The ordering ≤ t intuitively says 'degree of truth' increases if belief goes up and doubt goes down. Likewise ≤ k says 'degree of knowledge' goes up if both belief and doubt increase. It is easy to check that L 1 L 2 will always be a pre-bilattice that satisfies the interlacing conditions, an interlaced bilattice. In addition, if both L 1 and L 2 are distributive lattices, L 1 L 2 will be a distributive bilattice.
The construction above can be carried a little further. If
and there is an order reversing involution on L 1 a conflation operation can be introduced that commutes with the negation: set − a, b = −b, −a , where −a is the involute of a in L 1 . All of this is straightforward to check.
Theorem 6.1 Suppose L is a complete lattice with an order reversing involution. Then K(L) is isomorphic to the set of consistent members of an interlaced bilattice with negation and conflation.
That θ is an isomorphism is now straightforward. This Theorem applies, for example, to the system of Figure 4 , but not to that of Figure 5 . For the class of distributive bilattices, the bilattice construction given above is completely general. That is, if B is a distributive bilattice with a negation and a conflation that commute, then B is isomorphic to L L where L is a complete, distributive lattice with an order reversing involution. A proof of this can be found in [9] , with parts of it appearing in [8] and [13] . There is an obvious gap between the two Theorems above, which arises from the lack of a good representation theorem for interlaced, as opposed to distributive bilattices. But at any rate, the relationship between the interval construction and the bilattice construction is fully determined for distributive lattices.
Conclusion
The interval based construction of a family of logics generalizing Kleene's has an intuitive appeal to it. In addition, it produces a family of logics with a useful mathematical structure. As we remarked above, all such logics will be closed under meets and joins in the ≤ t ordering, and under meets and directed joins in the ≤ k ordering. This means that Kripke's fixpoint machinery, including the notion of intrinsic or optimal fixpoint, applies with essentially no changes. This machinery is appropriate in logic programming, too [4] . In addition, there are close relationships with bilattices. Consequently we expect that at least some members of the family of Kleene-like logics will find applications. First, of course, issues of axiomatization, and efficient proof procedures need to be addressed. There is clearly much enjoyable work ahead.
